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Abstract
Ccrsick's (1988, 1989) punctuated equilibrium model of group performance
posits that project groups move through two distinct work phases. Almost all
of the groups she observed showed a distinct shift in their activities exactly
at the midpoint of their task time. Our research broadens the definition of
group performance to include individual istically oriented two-party
negotiations and explores the generality of Gersick's model in a completely
different group environment. We mapped the temporal activities of bargaining
pairs facing short but reasonable deadlines and compared their negotiation
process to the predictions of Gersick's model, as well as approaches stressing
the effects of the deadline (a variation of the two-phase model), constant
action, or increasing action. Results indicate that the negotiations
exhibited temporal pacing that reflected increasing action and the deadline
more than a first half-second half, two-phase pattern. We conclude by
discussing the potential effects of cooperative and individualistic
orientations in group tasks.

Phases , Dcadl incs
,
and the Bargaining Process
Organizational researchers have typically confined themselves to a
unidirectional, linear time perspective (Dubinskas, 1988) in their study of
the dynamics of group development. This singular and normative orientation,
coupled with a tremendous heterogeneity of research foci and methods, has led
to a proliferation of stage—based models of group development, spanning two
(Anderson and Craesser, 1976), three (Bales and Strodtbeck, 1951), four (Hare,
1976; Tuckman, 1965; McCrath, 1984), or five stages (LaCoursierc , 1980).
In more recent research, Gersick (1988, 1989) observed a consistent
two—phase (rather than two stage) pattern of temporal behavior in problem
solving groups. Group members in her studies established an initial action
pattern early that carried them through phase one of their task time, moved
through a transition that presented them with an opportunity to redirect their
efforts which, if they did shift courses, carried them through phase two,
which culminated with a burst of activity to complete their task just prior to
their deadline.
For her 1988 study, Gersick intensively observed 8 naturally-occurring
groups that included between 3 and 12 members. All faced creative, managerial
tasks: three worked on solving a case study; the others designed an
evaluation system for a community fund raising organization, planned a one—day
management retreat, designed a new bank account, reorganized hospital
facilities, or designed a new institute for a university. Groups took between
1 week and 6 months to complete their tasks. The time constraints seemed
reasonable for each task. Gersick 's (1989) follow—up study was a one-hour
experiment where each of 8 groups of MBA students (6 groups of 3 members and 2
groups of 4) designed a commercial advertisement. As in the first study, the
group's task was cooperative and creative and had a moderate time limit.
The groups in both of Ccrsick's studies displayed remarkably similar
problem solving patterns. Their approach to the task emerged early (cf.,
Bettcnhausen and Murnighan, 1985) and carried through the first half of the
task time. They initiated a midpoint transition, surprisingly and
consistently close to the exact half-way point in the time allotted for the
task. Croups that made a successful transition qualitatively changed their
task orientations, often increasing their task activity: Members quickly
adopted specific plans and implemented a course of action that kept them busy
right up to and especially right at the deadline.
Gersick's two-phase model does not predict that all groups will change
their course right at the midpoint. Rather, the model predicts two distinct
phases, the first forming very early, the second occuring sometime later,
after an easily observable transition point. Gersick's two studies focused on
groups whose task demands were quite diverse. Nevertheless, their basic
similarity- -all cooperative, creative tasks; no severe time limitations- -may
have led to their almost completely uniform temporal pacing. Groups that face
markedly different tasks might be expected to punctuate their equilibrium
actions differently. The present study's use of a considerably different task
provides an opportunity for expanding the generality or establishing
additional boundary conditions for Gersick's model.
Ancona (1987; Gladstein, 1984) suggests that both time availability and
group members' task orientations contribute to group effectiveness.
Specifically, time constraints may prevent the completion of desirable,
constructive group activities, especially when the deadline is sharp. Groups
who recognize that their time is tight, for example, should begin working
right awav. Thus, wc might expect experienced groups with serious time
constraints to complete a transition between the two phases very early.
The structure of the group task may also reduce members' willingness to
take constructive reorganizing actions at the task midpoint. Ccrsick's groups
worked on a cooperative, creative task: Everyone in the group gained if the
group was successful. The addition of competitive motives, on the other hand,
might generate considerably different group dynamics. Almost every group
faces a social dilemma (Dawes, 1980): Individual members must choose whether
and how much to contribute to the group. If everyone invests time, effort,
and/or other resources, the probability of the group's success increases. If
some single individual does not contribute and the group succeeds, the
individual gains both from the success of the group and from not contributing.
If not enough members contribute, however, the group will not succeed, and
those who contributed will lose their investments. Thus, if we accept that
groups face an inherent social dilemma, then more competitive tasks should
increase the likelihood of social cheating (Trivers, 1971) and seriously
hamper group performance
.
The present study asks whether the two-phase model is applicable in
mixed (i.e., competitive and cooperative) motive group contexts. We used a
bargaining task that represents a basic strategic interaction: Two people
with differing preferences for different outcomes who must nevertheless come
to a mutual agreement for either of them to benefit. Each understands the
contingencies in the situation quite well and must determine how they can
reach the best possible agreement. Thus, these exchanges reflect typical
negotiations which have been used to model more general social interactions
(Walton and McKersie, 1965).
A negotiation between two competitive individuals is a very different
context from the groups in Gcrsick's studies. The task is competitive rather
than cooperative; the groups included two rather than three, four, or as many
as twelve people; the negotiations only lasted a short period of time; and the
bargainers interacted over computer terminals rather than face- to-face
.
Clearly, finding similar two-phase patterns of action would provide
considerable support for the model; finding different results would identify
some of the two-phase model's boundary conditions and could contribute to a
clearer documentation of basic bargaining processes.
Time and Group Development
Gersick's temporal model of group development focuses directly on the
larger issue of time. Time does not hold an important role in contemporary
empirical research; it has been a hidden dimension in most research efforts
even when anthropologists (e.g., Dubinskas , 1988) argue that time is a common
dimension of the work place.
When people view time as a unidirectional dimension or a calendarical
measurement, it constrains their behaviors and their interpretation of time
(Dubinskas, 1988). Researchers adopting the traditional, stage-based view of
group development largely fall into this category. Here, group life is taken
as fixed, and activities are analyzed and slotted into the life span post hoc.
When people view time as non-linear (Gould, 1987), it becomes a resource,
a commodity, or an object manipulated by its users. Researchers taking this
point of view might then be more concerned with how people use, manage, and
manipulate time. Gersick's (1988; 1989) two-phase model fits this
interpretation of time: Group members play an active role in handling the time
available for their task. The model implies that group members consider time
availability as they act by trying to gain control over the deadline and
carefully appropriating their time. When exactly half has disappeared -
-a
prominent point (Schclling, 1960) in their activities - -groups that
successfully moved through the transition shifted the emphasis of their
efforts and became more directed toward task completion.
Theoretical and empirical support for a multidimensional . active view of
time, and how it shapes task performance, is limited. Barley (1988), for
instance, reported time -oriented conflict between X—ray technologists, who
dealt with simple, standardized radiological procedures, and their supervising
radiologists, whose time perspective was less linear, possibly due to external
pressures from physicians, other radiologists, and other technologists.
Similarly, Dubinskas (1988) described conflict in a biotechnology research
company between research biologists, who had an open—ended concept of time and
no desire to target a research breakthrough for a given deadline, and
managers, who measured performance by costs and results and did not hesitate
to press the biologists for research results. Time may be a closed—ended
concept to managers (e.g., a deadline for every objective) or monochronic to
X-ray technologists (e.g., steady .predictable workflows, standardized work
procedures); it may also be open—ended for research scientists (e.g., research
has its own pace) or polychronic to radiologists (e.g., workflows are neither
steady nor predictable; work procedures undergo constant change).
Parkinson's Law (Parkinson, 1980) introduced an elastic aspect of time,
stating that "work expands so as to fill the time available for its
completion" (page 13). Although the Law's negative connotations and
implications of inefficiency may explain why few empirical studies have tested
its relevance, its general thrust is quite similar to that of the two-phase
model. In particular, time constraints may be an important factor determining
the speed and style of interactions among group members (e.g., McGrath &
Kelly, 1986; Iscnbcrg. 1981; Herman. 1972). Ccrsick's (1988; 1989)
observations also appear to conform to the Law: The shift in action to the
second phase indicates that work is clastic and will fit time availability.
The Present Study
We tested the generality of Ccrsick's temporal model in a competitive
strategic interaction between pairs of bargainers who needed to agree on the
division of a fixed outcome in a specified, limited time. The only
cooperative element in the task was the requirement that bargainers mutually
agree on the outcome. Otherwise, the task was very competitive: each person
had to compete with his or her counterpart to obtain a larger share of the
fixed payoff (100 lottery tickets). The time limit for each interaction was
set at 9 minutes. Pairs bargained anonymously via computer terminals; they
had no personal contact with each other.
The data reported here come from a study that was originally designed to
investigate the effects of focal points on bargaining processes and outcomes.
Focal points are outcomes that can be easily justified strategically. Thus,
50-50 is a focal point since it reflects the common social norm of equality.
The original design provided the two bargainers with different prizes
which were known to both bargainers and which could generate additional focal
points. Thus, in the four conditions, the bargainers' prizes were $36 and $4,
$20 and $5, $14 and $6, or $15 and $10. These conditions generated focal
points that were based on equalizing expected values in the lotteries that
followed negotiations. In the $36 and $4 pairs, for instance, the bargainers
who could only win an additional $4 could suggest that they divide the 100
lottery tickets so that they get 90 of the 100 tickets and the $36 players get
only 10. This would equalize their expected values in their independently
conducted lotteries: The $4 player would have a 90% chance of winning $4, for
an expected value of $3.60; the $36 pi aver would have a 10% chance of winning
$36, and an expected value of $3.60.
The effects of the focal point conditions arc reported elsewhere (Roth,
Murnighan, and Schoumakcr, 1988). The data arc reanalyzed here because the
fact that they were explicitly timed provides a unique opportunity to test
Gcrsick's model. The bargainers knew how much time they would have in
advance; they knew how much time remained while they were bargaining; and the
deadline was fixed and clear. These qualities made this data set ideal for an
objective test of Gersick's model.
The Bargaining Process
Bargainers usually began negotiations by asking for most of the payoff;
they subsequently reduced their demands incrementally, trading concessions
reciprocally to reach agreement. They had complete autonomy over their
bargaining activities- -except for the time limit. People who bargained well
put themselves in position to reach favorable agreements which increased their
chances for considerable financial rewards.
If the process conforms to Gersick's concept of temporal pacing and
negotiators intentionally attempt to initiate a transition, a distinctly
observable shift in their activities should occur sometime during their
bargaining. Since the ultimate goal in many negotiations is to move toward
and reach a favorable agreement, changes in the size and rate of concessions,
messages, proposals, and the frequency of time mentions (e.g., "Time is
running out- -we better hurry!") should indicate transition attempts within the
negotiations. Previous analysis of these data and the data from several other
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studies (Roth, Murnighan, and Schoumakcr, 1988) indicated that just less than
half (41%) of 956 agreements occurred as late as possible concentrating at the
deadline, even when the nature of the agreements changed. Temporal pacing was
obvious during these negotiations; bargainers tried to use time to pressure
the other bargainer into accepting an agreement and, if this failed, they made
sure that they actually reached an agreement that benefitted both parties
before time expired.
Our current analysis contrasts the predictions of the two—phase model
with the null hypothesis of no change in a group's activities over time. We
also consider the applicability of a deadline model, a variation of the two-
phase model , that predicts a long first phase devoted to information gathering
(e.g., "How will the other party react if I propose x? Let me try it and
see.") and fencing (e.g., trying advantageous moves that have low
probabilities of being successful - -but high outcomes) followed by a quick
transition as the deadline becomes imminent. Bargainers then change their
strategies toward more effective, upfront negotiations to avoid missing
achievable, acceptable agreements. The deadline model (Roth, Murnighan, and
Schoumaker, 1988) seriously abbreviates the second phase of the two -phase
model
.
We also investigate the additional possibility of constantly increasing
action: As group members become more and more attuned to their task, they may
increase their task activities (e.g., messages, proposals, concessions).
Although increasing action may be more appropriate for longer task times, its
underlying logic warrants its inclusion here.
The predictions of these four approaches are presented in Figure 1. We
represent the two-phase model with a transition exactly at the midpoint, as
11
this matches Ccrsick's observations, although this task mav generate a
different transition point that would still satisfy the model
.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Methods
Subjects
The participants in this study were 136 volunteers who were told that
they could win money by participating in an experiment on bargaining. Since
knowledge of expected values facilitated understanding of the instructions,
participants were recruited from undergraduate classes in economics. Each
bargainer participated in four consecutive negotiations, each with a different
opponent, resulting in 272 negotiations. Each session included between 8 and
16 bargainers seated behind opaque screens throughout a large room.
Procedure
The task asked pairs of participants to negotiate the distribution of 100
tickets in a" lottery. Participants were given lengthy instructions and
several practice sessions prior to beginning their negotiations. (See Roth
and Murnighan, 1982, for a more extensive description of the procedures).
Each of the four negotiations had a 9-minute (540 seconds) deadline; during
bargaining the time remaining was continuously displayed on the top right
corner of the computer screen. Bargainers could send any proposal and any
message they wished, with the exception of self^identifying messages.
The participants were instructed to try to get as many lottery tickets as
they could in each of their negotiations. They knew that one of their four
negotiations would be randomly chosen to determine which lottery would
actually be conducted for them. If they did not reach agreement in the
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selected negotiation, they received an appearance payoff, $4. If they reached
an agreement for that negotiation, the lottery was conducted and, if they won
it, they received additional prize money, depending on their prize condition.
The instructions made it clear that getting more lottery tickets would
increase their chances of winning their prize. Each bargainer's lottery was
independent of all others. Payments were made immediately after the
experiment
.
As noted, the experiment established four different prize combinations
for the bargaining pairs. The members of each pair had different prizes, one
high and one low; both knew the value of each other's prize^- . An agreement
was reached when the two bargainers' mutual demands totalled 100 lottery
tickets or less. Thus, if both demanded more than 50, as often happened early
in the negotiations, concessions were needed to reach an agreement. The
instructions made it clear that time was important and that all bargaining
ended at the deadline. Since the data were collected prior to the publication
of Gersick's model, the researchers and the participants were unaffected by
its hypotheses.
Dependent Variables
1. Message and proposal frequencies: The messages and proposals sent by each
pair were counted during successive 10—second intervals as separate measures
of activity. They were also summed for a measure of total activity.
2. Concessions: Concessions were proposals that demanded less than the
previous proposal ; frequencies were also recorded during successive 10—second
intervals. Concession size was measured by subtracting the present from the
previous demand. For example, if one bargainer demanded 45 tickets in a
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previous offer but reduced it Co 35 tickets in the present offer, a concession
of 10 was recorded for the pair.
3. Explicit temporal pacing: As in Gersick (1989), explicit temporal pacing
was measured by mentions of time. Bargainers could mention time as a tactic
to press for agreement. Messages such as "We are running out of time",
"Hurry", or "Look at the clock" were recorded as time-mentions.
4. Negotiations were classified as having reached an agreement or not; time
of agreement was scored as the second that an offer was accepted.
5. Initial differences: Bargainers who started by demanding outcomes far
distant from each other may have set the stage for qualitatively different
bargaining processes than bargainers whose first offers were closer together.
V.'e differentiated among pairs by the difference in their initial proposals.
Results
Table 1 reports the intercorrelations among the measures. Messages,
Insert Table 1 about here
proposals, and concessions were highly correlated with one another. More work
was necessary when the bargainers started with widely disparate opening
offers: They were related to more activity, larger concessions, and the amount
of time taken to reach an agreement. Experience, operational ized as the
number of negotiations completed (including the current one), ranging from 1
to 4, showed relatively small but significant correlations with most of the
measures. Agreements were related to less activity, particularly messages, a
smaller initial difference in opening offers, and larger average concessions.
All of these findings fit the picture of a typical negotiation.
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Since no activity followed an agreement, we divided the negotiations into
two sets: 147 pairs bargained cither for 510 seconds or more, reaching an
agreement during the last 30 seconds, or the full 540 seconds without reaching
an agreement; 125 pairs reached agreement sooner, prior to 510 seconds. Most
of our analyses concentrate on the first set of 147 pairs, as their
interactions span a similar time period; the quicker negotiations make the
identification of consistent transitions more difficult. The two set's
temporal activities were used independently to calculate correlations that
were very similar to each other and to the correlations for the entire sample,
with one exception: pairs who had longer negotiations generated a significant
positive association (r = .32, p < .01) between concession frequency and
reaching an agreement.
Experience yielded effects for proposal (F(3,256) = 2.58, p < .06),
message (F(3,256) = 5.51, p < .01), and concession frequencies (F(3,256) -
3.85, p < .05). In each case, increasing experience led to greater activity.
If the four negotiations were conceptualized as one rather than four separate
tasks- -even though the experiment was designed to render each negotiation
independent of all others --the data would support a model of increasing
activity over time.
Temporal Comparisons
Table 2 displays the results of simple comparisons of concession,
message, and proposal frequencies, time mentions, and the average concession
size in the first and second halves of the negotiation time. For all
Insert Table 2 about here
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negotiations , concessions were Larger and more frequent, and time mentions
were also more frequent in the second half. Messages and total activity,
however, were more frequent in the first half, probably due to the lack of
messsages or activity for negotiators who reached agreements early. When we
only consider long negotiations, lasting 510 seconds or more, all measures of
activity increased significantly in the second half.
In addition, differences in message length were tested via a comparison
of 42 messages randomly selected from the first half and 42 from the second
half. The number of words contained in the messages (mean = 10.19 words, s.
d. = 6.58, for the first half and 9.98 words, s. d. = 6.87 for the second)
were not significantly different from one another (F(l,82) = 0.02, ns).
Figures 2 through 5 display the frequencies of the dependent variables
for the long negotiations. Message frequencies were relatively stable over
Insert Figure 2, 3, 4, and 5 about here
time, showing no abrupt changes. Proposals and concessions (which are very
highly correlated) showed notable increases right at the deadline. Proposals
were frequent early and were constant and relatively infrequent until the end;
concessions showed gradual increases prior to the sharp increase at the end.
Unlike Gersick's (1989) groups, only 28% of the bargaining pairs (76 of
272 pairs) explicitly mentioned time. For the long negotiations shown in
Figure 5, mentions showed a sharp increase in the second half, closer to the
390-second mark than to the midpoint of the entire negotiation.
Goodness of fit tests are reported in Table 3. We segmented time into 54
blocks of 10 seconds each. We aggregated the number of agreements, proposals,
messages, concessions, and time mentions separately within each block. A line
16
graph similar to the bar graphs in Figures 2-5 was plotted, and a model of
each of the four predictions was fitted to each of the graphs, with ordinary
sums of squares used as a measure of goodness of fit. Agreement time for the
Insert Table 3 about here
entire sample and proposals for cither the entire sample or the long
negotiations strongly favored the deadline model, as did Figure 3.
Concessions favored either the deadline or the constantly increasing model, as
suggested by Figure 4. Messages favored the two-phase model for all
negotiations but show little difference among the models for the longer
negotiations. Time mentions favored the constantly increasing model over the
two-phase model; both models could be supported by Figure 5.
Patterns Within Individual Pairs
All of the prior results are based on aggregated data. If surges of
activity occurred at different times in different pairs, aggregation may have
hidden any evidence for the two-phase model. Thus, we inspected the patterns
of total activity (message + proposal frequencies) and the content of the
messages for the most experienced pairs (who had completed three negotiations)
who took 510 or more of the 540 seconds to reach an agreement (if they did
agree). This reduced the sample to a more manageable group of 31 pairs whose
behavior was not affected by any truncation of the process due to early
agreements.
This micro-analysis indicated that most pairs exhibited either constant
(n = 15) or constantly increasing activity (n = 7). Two pairs matched the
patterns of the deadline model; one matched the two-phase model. Others
showed unsustained surges (n = 2), increasing activity- -no activity--
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increasing activity (n = 3), or a decreasing pattern of activity (n = 1).
Analysis of message content also provided no startling revelations.
Discussion
In general, these results do not support a generalization of Ccrsick's
two-phase model of group performance to bargaining pairs. The least pointed
of our analyses, the t-tcsts comparing first and second half activity,
supported the model most: Broadly speaking, messages, proposals, concessions,
and time mentions increased from the first to the second half of the task for
pairs that took a long time bargaining. Time mentions duplicated some aspects
of the temporal pacing observed in Cersick's (1988, 1989) studies. The shift
to more time mentions, however, occurred much later than halftime and could
just as easily be taken as support for a model of constantly increasing
action. The more frequent activities- -messages and proposals- -did not follow
a two-phase pattern.
Responding frantically just before the deadline may accurately reflect
some of the behaviors of these bargaining pairs. This corresponds to the end
of the two-phase model, where groups work harder to achieve completion.
Whether a separate deadline model with a conceptually different character to
that of the original two-phase model explains the data better is open to
argument. The essential observation, however, is identical in these
bargaining pairs and in Gersick's problem solving groups: Everyone moves
faster just before the deadline. People may simply be myopic about time
before the deadline; alternatively, they may use the time early in their task
to consciously explore potential outcomes. When the deadline finally becomes
imposing and undeniable, activity escalates dramatically. In the current
study, the data for concessions reflected this pattern best- -and this is
18
strategically appropriate given the nature of the task, where a big concession
at the last second can finalize an agreement and avoid zero outcomes.
Constant or increasing activity also represented messages and time
mentions well. Thus, this study's ability to separate bargainers' different
negotiation activities generated observations that suggest that different
actions may each have their own time -oriented phasing.
The Sources of Different Results
A strong point of this study is the use of previously collected data to
test Gersick's model. We had no knowledge of the two—phase phenomenon at the
time of the experiment, yet the data are clearly sufficient to test the model.
Thus, experimenter bias is the first alternative explanation that can be ruled
out as an explanation of our findings.
Gersick's (1988; 1989) two studies used different subject populations
and tasks of different length. This study used a sample that was comparable
to one of Gersick's- -MBA students- -and a much shorter task time. The
bargainers in this study had only nine minutes to reach an agreement. Could
the differences be explained by an unreasonably limited time for the task?
We would argue that the time was more than ample for this task.
Everyone was given plenty of practice prior to the first session. The task
itself - -bargaining over who would get how many of the 100 lottery tickets- -was
relatively simple. Most pairs had no problem reaching agreement: Of the 272
interactions, only 63 ended in disagreement. Many of these pairs were close
to agreement and disagreed only because both bargainers were hoping that the
other would concede at the last second. Indeed, the entire pattern of
behavior (particularly the constant message frequencies) indicates that the
process was not particularly hurried. Few concessions early and more later
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would have fit the two-phase model quite well; it also fits the prescriptions
of many models of negotiation (e.g., Walton and McKcrsic, 1965). Concessions
followed this pattern but reflected the effects of deadlines rather than the
broader two-phase model. The time allotted was clearly sufficient for
conscious, thoughtful strategy implementation.
If we conclude, then, that subject populations and time differences
cannot account for the disparate findings, other aspects of the tasks become
the most likely causal factor. First note that this task allowed participants
to wait until the very last seconds to strike an agreement. Although not
laying the groundwork for an agreement might force a negotiator to accept a
poor outcome at the end, and early bargaining strategics could reduce the
likelihood of such a result, a solution could still be reached instantly,
unlike the project groups Gersick studied.
In addition, as we have suggested earlier, the competitive or
cooperative nature of the tasks may be critical. In cooperative tasks, early
interactions are often marked by social activity. In very competitively
oriented tasks, individuals typically want no part of socializing. Both
reactions can be construed as strategic: Establishing interpersonal bonds
with others may facilitate coordination in a cooperative venture; denying
interpersonal connections allows individualistic actors to pursue their own
ends with less concern for the other party. Thus, the present results suggest
the following hypothesis: The more cooperative a group task, the more likely
the group will engage in social activity, especially in the early phases of
the task. This hypothesis may explain some of the differences between
Gersick' s results and ours. It also identifies an underlying reason for
observations of two phases in group performance.
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If wc assume that activity is necessary for efficiency, as it should be
in most group tasks, the results of research on integrative bargaining
problems (e.g., Pruitt, 1983) sheds some light on this hypothesis. In a
typical integrative bargaining task, two bargainers face a multi- issue
negotiation; their interests diverge on at least two issues. Their different
preferences for these issues establish the possibility for tradeoffs where one
bargainer does well on one issue and the other docs well on the other. Such
integrative solutions distribute outcomes to the bargainers very efficiently.
In experiments where either or both bargainers have been given moderate
or difficult aspirations (e.g., "You must achieve at least X; anything less is
like getting nothing."), they are more likely to reach the integrative
solution (Huber and Neale, 1987). Without aspirations, bargainers are less
individualistic, possibly more social and cooperative, but less efficient in
terms of the expediency of making a decision or reaching an agreement.
Conceptualizing aspirations as the basis for more individualistic
motives (Pruitt, 1983) suggests that individualism can increase efficiency.
If this result generalizes to problem solving groups (and integrative
bargaining is often referred to as exemplifying a problem solving orientation
in bargaining) , the group as a whole may well be more efficient as the task
allows the group's members to be more individualistic. There will certainly
be a limit: When the members of a group are so intensely individualistic (or
competitive^) that they totally disregard everyone else's interests, the group
may have difficulty achieving anything. Nevertheless, the notion that
individualism rather than cooperation may lead to efficiency, as might shorter
phases of social action early in the cycle of group problem solving, fits the
underlying philosophy of capitalism (Smith, 1937) and may also be applicable
at the level of organizational groups. Recent findings by Chalos and Haka
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(1990), which show that individualistic motives on integrative bargaining
problems in the context of transfer pricing generate greater firm profit, also
supports this logic. Intra-group competitive or individualistic orientations,
then, may be more effective than cooperation especially if they arc channeled
toward the achievement of supcrordinate or organizational goals. Indeed, the
concepts discussed here show clear parallels to the literature comparing do-
your-best and difficult but attainable goals (Locke, Saari , Shaw, and Latham
1981).
Our findings also suggest that the entire concept of completely
cooperative group interaction may be problematic. Indeed, as we have
mentioned earlier, almost all groups face a social dilemma. Temptations to
act individualistically may be everprcsent. This suggests that the often
observed process losses exhibited by task groups (Steiner, 1972) may find
their root in cooperative motivations. Rather than being explained by
difficulties in coordination that might result, for example, when groups add
additional members, process losses may also arise from disincentives for
personal benefit. Cooperative motivations, then, may be a more basic causal
factor; they may contribute to difficulties in task coordination. (This
argument does not, however, imply that a competitive orientation is always
functional, as noted above.)
This discussion is necessarily speculative. Nevertheless, a focus on
the individualistic aspects of cooperative group tasks offers not only a
variety of potentially important questions for theory and research but also a
means for drastically reducing the number of categories needed for the
taxonomy of group tasks (e.g., see McGrath, 1984). At the very least, this
discussion suggests that the mixed-motives inherent in group tasks might be
more important than other, more performance -based criteria. In the current
22
case, tasks that arc neither so cooperative nor so individualistic might
provide initial results concerning our hypothesis that cooperative motivations
may contribute significantly to group inefficiency.
23
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Footnote
^Two pavoff conditions, fixed and mixed, were included in the original
design. In the fixed conditions, each member of a bargaining pair kept the
same prize value for each of their four negotiations where the only thing
changing was their opponent. Thus, players with a $4 prize always had a $4
prize and negotiated four times with someone with a known $36 prize. For the
mixed conditions, bargainers were assigned cither the four high prize values
($36, $14, $15, and $20) or the four low prize values ($4, $6, $10, and $5).
In this case, one bargainer always had a higher prize in his or her four
negotiations; the other bargainer always had the lower prize. Pairs of
bargainers in the mixed payoff conditions experienced all four prize
combinations: $4^-$36, $6-$14, $10^-15, and $5-$20.
^The constant -sum nature of the task in this study was simultaneously
competitive and individualistic: Doing better for oneself meant the other
person did worse. Competitive or individualistic behavior can be
differentiated in other group tasks when outcomes are not constant-sum.
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TABLE 1
INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG KEY TEMPORAL MEASURES AND NEGOTIATION OUTCOMES
N Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6
1
.
Agreement
(1-yes, 0-no)
2. Time mention frequency
3. Negotiation experience
( 1 to A negotiations)
4. Time of agreement
(seconds) 209 410.98 142.6095 N. A.* 0.19 0.15
5. Total activity level
(messages + proposals) 272 14 . 89 5.7265 -0.27 0.25 0.25 0.82
6. Proposal frequency 272 6.32 2.8276 -0.08 0.18 0.16 0.67 0.77
7. Message frequency 272 8.57 4.0224 -0.32 0.24 0.24 0.73 0.90 0.41
272 0.77 0.4226
272 0.35 0.6240 -0.17
272 2.50 1.1201 0.07 -0.02
.
272 3 94
272 7 ,71
272 32 .81
8. Concession frequency . 2.5149 0.00 0.19 0.20 0.67 70 0.90 0.38
9. Concession size . 9 5701 0.16 0.05 -0.11 -0.00 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06
10. Initial difference . 22.2523 -0.24 0.21 -0.03 0.41 0.36 0.39 0.25 0.43 0.52
Notes: Except for time of agreement, correlations > 0.07 or < -0.07 are
statistically significant at a-0 . 05 ; those > 0.16 or < -0.16 are
statistically significant at a-0. 01. For time of agreement,
correlations > 0.15 or < -0.15 are statistically significant at
a-0. 05; those > 0.40 or < -0.40 are statistically significant at
a-0. 01.
* due to restriction of range.
TABLE 2
COMPARISONS OF BARGAINING ACTIVITIES IN FIRST AND SECOND HALVES
27
Means
0-270 271-540 Mean sdd
Seconds Seconds Difference
P<
ALL NEGOTIATIONS (N=272)
Total activity
Proposal frequency
Message frequency
Concession frequency
Time mention frequency
Average concession size
7.91 6.98 -0.93 0.2245 -4.60 .0001
3.22 3.09 -0.13 0.1355 -0.98 n. s
.
4.70 3.87 -0.83 0.1559 -5.35 .0001
1.22 2.72 1.50 0.1209 12.37 .0001
0.06 0.29 0.24 0.0351 6.70 .0001
5.11 6.75 1.64 0.8328 1.96 .0506
NEGOTIATIONS WITH AT LEAST
510 SECONDS CONTACT TIME (N=147)
Total activity
Proposal frequency
Message frequency
Concession frequency
Time mention frequency
Average concession size
8.33 9.61 1.29 0.1814 7.09 .0001
3.24 4.08 0.84 0.1466 5.75 .0001
5.07 5.57 0.50 0.1690 2.94 .0038
1.21 3.62 2.41 0.1368 17.61 .0001
0.07 0.37 0.30 0.0524 5.72 .0001
3.99 6.13 2.14 0.9836 2.18 .0309
TABLE 3
GOODNESS OF FIT COMPARISON FOR THE FOUR MODELS
(VIA RESIDUAL SUM OF SQUARE)*
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Temporal
activities
Model 1
Constant
Action Model
Model 2:
Constantly
Increasing
Model
Model 3:
Deadline
Model
Model 4:
Two -Phase
Model
All Negotiations
(N-272)
Agreement time
Proposals
Messages
Concessions
Time mentions
3060.1481
6073.3704
8332.1481
8066.3704
210.9074
2443.1079
n. a.
a
n.a. a
3096.7133
116.3121
390.7925
3969.1698
7874.8679
4725.8868
164.5283
2775.4074
6043.8518
7021.8519
5191.6297
132.7407
Negotiations Lasting
at least 510 Seconds
(N-147)
Proposals
Messages
Concessions
Time mentions
5106.6111
2544.5926
6048.4444
164.9074
4496.9045
2446.9045
2681.1650
84.1920
1869.0377
2473.2075
2532.7925
210.8302
4857.4445
2514.9630
4175.8519
104.8148
Underlined figures represent the least sum of square among the 4 models
The least square fit to these variables resulted in a negative slope.
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FIGURE 1
FOUR PATTERNS OF TEMPORAL ACTION
Activity Activity
Time Time
(a) The Constant Action Model (b) The Constantly Increasing Model
Activity Activity
Time Time
(c) The Deadline Model (d) Gersick's Two Phase Model
Figure 2
Frequency Distribution o-f Messages
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Figure 3
Frequency Distribution o-f Proposals
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Figure 4
Frequency Distribution o-F Concessions
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Figure
Frequency Distribution o-f Time Mentions
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